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Womenandchildren and Elephants as Justification for Force 
Abstract 
This article examines the use of force described as ‘robust peacekeeping’. Through a review 
of innovation in Security Council practice – in particular, thematic resolutions, targeted 
sanctions and robust peacekeeping – I analyse the role normative assertions of the Council, 
found in thematic resolutions and preambles, play in underpinning new forms of force. 
Understood in this context, feminists and others who have agitated for inclusion within the 
work of the Security Council are counselled against pursuing projects that expand the powers 
of the institution while there remains a lack of checks on how force is mobilised. The 
reluctance of feminist and/ or critical engagement that addresses the structural aspects of 
institutional spaces, such as the Security Council, consequently risks a legitimation of the 
institution without significant gains in terms of gender equality or, if viewed through recent 
resolutions establishing targeted sanctions against wildlife poachers, for the protection of 
elephants.  
Keywords 
Robust peacekeeping; protection of civilians; women, peace and security; Security Council; 
targeted sanctions; feminist approaches 
 
This article is concerned with how the authority of Security Council to authorise new 
measures short of force, and new forms of force, is bolstered by the potential legitimacy the 
protection of civilians and the women, peace and security agendas project onto the Council‟s 
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action.
 1
 The use of military force, even when authorised by the United Nations collective 
security structure, requires a mechanism to mobilise support from international actors, 
soldiers and member states. The move toward a focus on the protection of civilians by the 
Security Council, both within mission mandates
2
 and as a normative commitment
3
 of the 
Council, is an increasingly important mechanism for the mobilisation of international support 
for the use of force: providing – it seems – a space of legitimation for authorisations of force 
within a peacekeeping operation.  
I situate the women, peace and security framework within the larger protection of civilian 
agenda
4
 and argue that the eight Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security 
must be analysed as an aspect of larger trends within the work of the Security Council, 
including broader thematic work, the authorisation of robust peacekeeping and the expansion 
of targeted sanctions regimes. As such, the authority of the Council to authorise force, 
expanded via these normative components in thematic resolutions has developed to support 
both authorised and unauthorised force. The failure of feminist dialogues to broach or engage 
with this consequence of institutional engagement is of considerable importance. I open a 
                                                 
1
 Otto, D, 'The Security Council‟s Alliance of Gender Legitimacy' in H. Charlesworth and 
J. Coicaud (ed), Fault Lines of International Legitimacy (2010) 239-275. 
2
 See, for example: SC Res 2017 (2015) 28
th
 April 2015 extending MINUSCA‟s mandate in the CAR (note 
paragraph 32 which include protection of civilians as a key component of the mandate). 
3
 See, for example: SC Res 1674 (2006) 28
th
 April 2006 on the Protection of Civilians (note paragraph 16 
linking this to peacekeeper mandates). 
4
 Engle makes a similar argument, locating the women, peace and security resolutions with the human security 
agenda of the Security Council, see: Karen Engle, „The Grip of Sexual Violence: Reading UN Security Council 
Resolutions on Human Security‟  in Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds), Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender 
Equality and Collective Security, Palgrave, 2014.  
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dialogue on the expanding legitimacy and authority of the Security Council acts, to 
encourage further feminist and critical scholarship to ask questions about the consequences of 
pursuing normative projects within the Security Council, in particular, and under 
international law more broadly.  
The Security Council‟s attention to the protection of civilians in armed conflict and 
peacekeeping states emerges across three types of institutional outputs. The first output is 
discoverable in Security Council resolutions that provide normative responses, and thus 
general frameworks, articulating the importance of an understanding of the protection of 
civilians in peace and enforcement missions.
5
 The second output emerges in situation specific 
mandates issued by the Security Council which increasingly refer to the protection of 
civilians as a core component of the mandate, including the mandate for robust peacekeeping 
operations. The third area of output is found in the work of co-ordinating and subsidiary 
organs, such as the Secretary-General‟s Office and special committee reports that expand 
peacekeeping rules of engagement and regulations to include the protection of civilians as a 
component of peacekeeper self-defence.
6
 All of these outputs are relevant to the discussion 
here; however I focus on the thematic resolutions and situation specific resolutions from the 
UN Security Council to discuss the nexus between the protection of civilians and robust 
peacekeeping authorisations, while acknowledging the broader institutional apparatus that 
further sustain the protection of civilians narrative. I argue that analysis of the protection of 
civilians commitments of the Security Council should encompass adjunct normative 
frameworks, including the women, peace and security resolutions, the protection of children 
                                                 
5
 See, for example: SC Res 1674 (2006) 28
th
 April 2006 or SC Res 2227 (2015) 29
th
 June 2015 para. 14 (d). 
6
 See, in particular, the Capstone Document here: http://effectivepeacekeeping.org/sites/default/files/04/DPKO-
DFS_Capstone%20Document.pdf  (last accessed January 2015).  
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in armed conflict resolutions, as well resolutions on the rule of law and the responsibility to 
protect. Furthermore, this combined and complementary normative output of the Council 
must be understood via analysis of the expanding manner in which the Security Council is 
currently willing to authorise the use of force: raising questions with regard to how the 
Council mobilises its authority and the tools used to legitimate the expansion of authority.  
Robust peacekeeping operations occur within the context of peacekeeping missions, have the 
consent of the host state and authorise the deployment of a small, time limited enforcement 
unit with a specific military goal. Robust peacekeeping is distinguished from peace 
enforcement, that is, a peacekeeping mission transformed as a whole into a Chapter VII 
enforcement missions and where the consent of the host state is unlikely or not possible. 
Peace enforcement missions, such as those in Haiti,
7
 Somalia
8
 or the Ivory Coast,
9
 offer 
similar protection of civilian narratives although the clear enforcement capacity of the 
mission as whole, perhaps, aligns these authorisations as closer to Responsibility to Protect 
resolutions, such as the authorisation of force in Libya in 2011.
10
 Although not the direct 
focus of this discussion I return to peace enforcement at the close of the article as a means to 
think concretely about the expansion of Security Council powers and to raise questions about 
what, where and when any confines, if any, should be placed on the authorisation of force.  
In addition to robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement, I explore the sites where the 
Security Council has expanded its powers through its practice. While the capacity for 
international organisations to determine their practice through reference to the object and 
                                                 
7
 SC Res 1529 (29
th
 February 2004). 
8
 SC Res 794 (3
rd
 December 1992). 
9
 SC Res 1528 (27
th
 February 2004). 
10
 SC Res 1973(17
th
 March 2011). 
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purpose of the organisation is not disputed, the proclivity of the Security Council to broadly 
interpret its remit well beyond the scope the Charter drew considerable attention in the lead 
up to the 2005 Summit Outcome document.
11
 In particular concerns about the Security 
Council taking up a legislative function drew comment,
12
 however by the end of the decade 
the push for the Security Council to continue to expand its normative framework was 
emergent from a range of sites, including those working on women‟s security, the protection 
of children in armed conflict, arms control and energy security, amongst others. At the same 
time debates and dialogue around whether the Security Council represented the best place for 
expansive law making, or even whether the Security Council had the capacity to issue 
normative as opposed to situation specific resolutions, receded. I seek to re-invigorate this 
discussion identifying the production of a large corpus of normative resolutions, the 
expanded targeted sanctions regime and the development of robust peacekeeping initiatives 
as ultimately permitting new spaces for the authorisation of military force by the Security 
Council that have, thus far, attracted insufficient attention from international legal scholars.  
In the following section I describe the range of sites where the Council has expanded its 
remit, with a specific focus on normative resolutions, targeted sanctions regimes and the 
robust peacekeeping components of the DRC mission in the six years between 2008 and 
2014. I conclude with a discussion of the Security Council‟s invocation of protection of 
civilian narratives, the sites in which the protection of civilians emerges in the Security 
Council‟s work and the role the production of specifically feminised vulnerability plays in the 
                                                 
11
 See, for example: Talmon, S., „The Security Council as World Legislature‟ 99 (2005) American Journal of 
International Law, 175; Szasz, P., „The Security Council starts Legislating‟ 96 (2002) American Journal of 
International Law, 901. 
12
 Ibid. 
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mobilising of force to protect civilians. I then consider the Security Council‟s recent 
initiatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to stem the flow of funds from 
the trafficking in ivory that are believed to play a role in fuelling the continuation of violence 
in the DRC. With 20 000 elephants killed each year in the region for their ivory,
13
 this is a 
novel use of Security Council powers with some commentators calling for the sanctions 
against those profiting from wildlife trafficking to be extended to a robust peacekeeping 
mandate.
14
 I conclude that similar to the robust peacekeeping initiatives built on the 
protection of civilian narratives, the protection of elephants is neither cause nor goal, 
illuminating the propensity toward international policing through targeted sanctions and 
robust peacekeeping by the Security Council. Ultimately this indicates a need for caution 
when supporting the expansion of normative frameworks within the Security Council as the 
narrative is increasingly deployed to enhance the authorisation of the use of force. The 
protection of civilian narrative, alongside the responsibility to protect, plays an important role 
in making military force seem necessary as it reduces the complexity of conflict to the need 
for a morally dictated mandate with military solutions. At the same time the authority of the 
Council expands and the legitimacy of force as a mechanism to transform security in a 
positive way remains unchallenged. 
 
II. THE EXPANDING POWERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
                                                 
13
 Peters, Anne, „Novel Practice of the Security Council: Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking as a Threat to the 
Peace‟ EJIL TALK! February 12th 2014, available online at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/novel-practice-of-the-
security-council-wildlife-poaching-and-trafficking-as-a-threat-to-the-peace/#more-10362 (last accessed 
February 2014). 
14
Ibid. 
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Since its inception as a primary organ of the United Nations the Security Council has 
interpreted its mandate beyond the precise wording of the Charter to ensure a commitment to 
the object and purpose of the organisation. As early as the Security Council‟s second 
meeting, adaptations were made to facilitate both consideration and decisions on situations on 
the Security Council‟s agenda.15 Throughout the early phase of the Security Council‟s work 
issues such as the deployment of peacekeeping, the capacity of permanent members to 
abstain from voting and the use of Member States to provide leadership on missions 
demonstrated the Security Council‟s willingness to advance its own mandate through novel 
responses to threats to international peace and security. This creative interpretation of the 
Security Council‟s mandate expanded further in the post-1990 period, when the notion of 
what constituted a threat to international peace and security was slowly expanded to 
accommodate humanitarian emergencies and internal conflicts with an international 
dimension. In the post-1990 period, the Security Council began to issue normative, or 
general, resolutions alongside its responses to specific situations. In this section I consider the 
most recent innovations in the Security Council‟s work including the continued expansion of 
the normative work undertaken and the refinement of sanctions regimes to include targeted 
and smart sanctions, as well as the development of robust peacekeeping.  
i. Normative Components 
The areas where the Security Council has been willing to release resolutions that contain 
general statements, rather than situation specific responses, has increased to include - by 2016 
                                                 
15
 Security Council Resolution 2 (30
th
 January 1946): the Security Council invited the representative of Iran to 
its meeting to facilitate a decision from the Council and having had agreed during its second meeting that „States 
which have presented complaints should be invited to participate in the work, in the sittings of the Council‟.   
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- resolutions on: the Rule of Law;
16
 Protection of Civilians;
17
 the Protection of Journalists;
18
 
Women, Peace and Security;
19
 Children and Armed Conflict;
20
 Terrorism;
21
 Arms Control 
and Disarmament, including small arms;
22
 health crisis;
23
 energy, climate and natural 
resources;
24
 as well as hosting general debates and issuing statements on a wider range of 
„new‟ challenges to international peace and security.25 Although this vast output from the 
Security Council would merit from further attention and analysis,
26
 I will focus on the 
resolutions on women, peace and security to demonstrate the nexus between thematic work 
and additional developments in preamble and situation specific resolutions. In focusing on 
these specific aspects I will demonstrate the relationship between the Security Council‟s 
                                                 
16
 For an up to date review, see: the Secretary-General‟s Report, Measuring the effectiveness of the support 
provided for by the UN System for the promotion of the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, 
UN Doc. S/2013/341 (11
th
 June 2013).  
17
 S/RES/1265 (17 September 1999); S/RES/1296 (19 April 2000); S/RES/1502 (26 August 2003); S/RES/1674 
(28 April 2006); S/RES/1894 (11 November 2009) 
18
 SC Res 1738 (23
rd
 December 2006) 
19
 See below, notes 25-27. 
20
 See, for example, SC R 2068 (19 September 2012). 
21
 See, for example, SC Res 2133 (27
th
 January 2014). 
22
 See, for example, SC Res 2117 (26
th
 September 2013) and SC Res 2055 (26
th
 June 2012).  
23
 See, for example, SC Res 2177 (18
th
 September 2014). 
24
 See, for example, SC Res 1625 (14
th
 September 2005) which includes sustainable development within a 
general resolution on conflict prevention. 
25
 For example, the Security Council hosted an open debate on „New Challenges to international Peace and 
Security‟ on Wednesday 23rd November, 2011, see: http://www.whatsinblue.org/2011/11/council-briefing-on-
new-challenges-to-international-peace-and-security.php (last accessed January 2016).  
26
 See: www.securitycouncilreport.org for detailed study of each of these areas.  
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increased use of force as an enforcement mechanism and the normative framework it has 
developed.  
By 2016 the women, peace and security framework consisted of eight resolutions, with seven 
of the eight resolutions issued after 2008.
27
 The content of the Security Council women, 
peace and security resolutions extends from the broad focus on issues related to women, 
peace and security in the first women, peace and security resolution, 1325,
28
 through to the 
detailed response to sexual violence in four of the resolutions
29
 and the more recent, broad 
ranging, content of Security Council resolutions 2122 and 2242.
30
 These are, potentially, the 
set of thematic that have received attention and critique well beyond that given to standard 
Security Council outputs. The first women, peace and security resolution, 1325, was unique 
in the role that NGOs were able to play in the drafting of the resolution, in particular 
Women‟s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) were instrumental in the 
pursuit, construction and drafting of this resolution.
31
 The involvement of civil society is 
generally believed to be reflected in the broad attention to a cross section of feminist issue in 
                                                 
27
 After the issue of SC Res 1325 in 2000 the Security Council did not issue the second women, peace and 
security resolution, 1820, until June 2008.  
28
 SC Res 1325 (30
th
 October 2000). 
29
 SC Res 1820 (18
th
 June 2008); SC Res 1888 (30
th
 October 2009); SC Res 1960 (16
th
 December 2010); SC Res 
2106 (June 2013).  
30
 SC Res 2122 (18
th
 October 2013); SC Res 2242 (13
th
 October 2015). 
31
 See Felicity Ruby, „Security Council Resolution 1325: A Tool for Conflict Resolution?‟ in Gina Heathcote 
and Dianne Otto (eds), Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security, Palgrave, 2014, 
however note that SC Res 2122  (18
th
 October 2013) marks a return to a larger (future) input from civil society, 
see: http://wpsac.wordpress.com/2014/03/06/triskaidekaphilia-2013-and-the-two-new-women-peace-and-
security-resolutions/ (last accessed February 2014). 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Journal on the Use of Force and International Law published by 
Taylor & Francis: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjuf20  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23407/  
 
this resolution, including women‟s participation at all levels of decision-making, the 
development of gender perspectives within post-conflict institutional structures, the need to 
respond to gender-based violence in conflict zones, particularly rape and other forms of 
sexual abuse, and recognition of the special needs of women and girls in conflict and post-
conflict communities. Subsequent resolutions, while no longer drafted by WILPF, continued 
to benefit from the transnational and international women‟s networks, as well as the eventual 
creation of UN Women, in terms of lobbying and expertise. The result is a complex array of 
varied feminist and gender concerns across the eight resolutions on women, peace and 
security. In addition, the different resolutions are influenced by the member state holding 
presidency of Security Council at the time of issue, in particular the US and the UK taking 
the lead on the resolutions focussed on sexual violence during their occupation of the 
presidency chair but equally Viet Nam‟s production of resolution 1888. 
The women, peace and security resolutions, while producing a normative commitment within 
the Security Council, have also influenced the means through which local women‟s groups 
challenge and speak to national governing bodies, transforming local gender policy, advocacy 
and strategy within states. This has been documented as having positive impact on local 
women‟s initiatives32 while also, problematically, imposing limits on the types of initiatives 
global and national donors are prepared to support.
33
 At the same time the women, peace and 
security framework has influenced the Security Council‟s Chapter VII authorisations. In 
particular, through the development of additional paragraphs regarding gender issues within 
                                                 
32
For examples see www.peacewomen.org  
33
 Richter-Devroe, S., „“Here it‟s not about conflict resolution – We can only resist”: Palestinian women‟s 
activism in conflict resolution and non-violent resistance‟, in N. Al-Ali and N. Pratt (eds), Women and War in 
the Middle East (London: Zed Books, 2009) 158 
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situation specific resolutions. For example, Security Council resolution 2100, which 
authorised the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013, under the protection of civilians component of the 
mandate in paragraph 16 (c) requires UN personal on the mission to: „provide specific 
protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the 
deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the 
needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict‟.34 This is reiterated 
as a component of the MINUSMA mandate in 2015 via Resolution 2227,
35
 as is the centrality 
of protection of civilians to the mandate. In essence, the mandate establishes the parameters 
within which force might be mobilised by the UN force despite MINUSMA being established 
as a peacekeeping mission. If force is used in protection of the mandate it is regarded as 
within the permitted practice of the mission: the mandate is then articulated as the protection 
of civilians and the protection of civilians is specified as including the protection of women 
and children from, in particular, conflict-related sexual violence.  
Similarly, in Resolution 2211 on the DRC the Council reaffirms, „that the successful 
protection of civilians is critical to the fulfilment of MONUSCO‟s mandate‟.36 In resolution 
2211 the Council also reduces the number of troops stationed in the DRC, while in paragraph 
25 condemning „the brutal killings of hundreds of civilians in the Beni area‟ and „expressing 
„deep concern regarding the persistence of violence in the region‟.37 The resolutions ties the 
commitment to the protection of civilians to the protection of women and children throughout 
                                                 
34
 SC Res 2100 (25
th
 April 2013) para. 16 (c) (ii). 
35
 SC Res 2227 (29
th
 June 2015)  para. 14 (d) 
36
 SC Res 2211 (26
th
 March 2015) preamble.  
37
 SC Res 2211 (26
th
 March 2015) para. 25. 
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the resolution and specifically authorises MONUSCO to „take all necessary measures‟ to 
„ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians‟.38 The Beni massacres, 
which occurred in the early months of 2015, occurred during the period when the 
MONUSCO mandate was already established as to protect civilians. This subsequent 
resolution while reiterating the need to protect civilians reduces the number of peacekeeping 
troops in the DRC suggesting real operational problems with actually achieving this goal. 
Furthermore, the linkage of the sexual violence components within women, peace and 
security agenda with the mandate for the protection of children in armed conflict, mirrors the 
linkage of the women, peace and security agenda and the protection of children agenda 
within presidential statements and Secretary-General Reports. This is despite the women, 
peace and security establishing a larger framework than a focus solely on the combating on 
sexual violence in armed conflict as the eight resolutions include women‟s participation, 
recognition of women‟s diversity and the need for consultation with women‟s organisations 
and representatives. Worryingly, the linking of women and children has additional, obvious, 
conceptual and practical concerns as the linking of womenandchildren without differentiation 
of diverse needs both within and across these categories also infantilises women and 
perpetuates the association of femaleness with dependency, a lack of full legal subjectivity 
and the need for protection. 
The third site, beyond the women, peace and security resolutions and situation specific 
resolutions, where the normative framework on women, peace and security is advanced is in 
the preamble to situation specific resolutions. Often overlooked because of the non-binding 
nature of preamble material in Security Council resolutions, the expansive nature of the 
                                                 
38
 SC Res 2211 (26
th
 March 2015) para. 9. 
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preambles in the Security Council‟s more recent resolutions and their important signalling of 
larger agendas, including the women, peace and security framework, function as a space of 
normative and progressive development of the legal work of the Security Council. For 
example, the Security Council‟s willingness to invoke human rights, the responsibility to 
protect and the rule of law in the preamble to resolutions links in the larger thematic work of 
the Security Council with the authorisations it makes. For example, when the Security 
Council authorised the use of military force in Libya in 2011 the insertion of a reference to 
both the responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians in the preamble of resolution 
1973 epitomised the importance of the Security Council‟s shift in preamble output. In the 
Libyan authorisation questions about the reasons why force was authorised despite the 
internal nature of the situation were, in part, answered through the deployment of this 
material in the preamble. This seems to indicate awareness on the part of Security Council of 
a need to construct justifications for its deployment of military force. Preamble content 
provides a legitimation of the content of authorisations, in particular when the institutional 
authorised action expands the parameters of the Council‟s own legitimacy.  Although, like 
the foray into thematic resolutions, this is not a requirement under the United Nations 
Charter, the importance of preambles seems evident in their increased length and coverage of 
thematic and external issues: Security Council resolution 2246 on piracy in Somali territorial 
waters has five pages of preambular material addressing issues from sexual exploitation of 
women and children, natural resources, fishing, the work of the insurance and maritime 
industry and human rights.
39
 The explanatory role of this material might be celebrated. 
However, when coupled with the Security Council‟s expanded use of binding authorisations, 
questions about the role of military force in the pursuit of peace and the use of normative and 
                                                 
39
 SC Res 2246 (10
th
 November 2015). 
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affective terminology and agendas to mobilise support for military force, via the Security 
Council, are increasingly apparent.  
ii. Targeted Sanctions 
Over the same period that Security Council developed the content and range of thematic 
resolutions, shifts occurred in collective impositions of sanctions regimes. In particular, after 
the decade of comprehensive sanctions against the Hussein regime in Iraq, the late 1990s saw 
a turn by the Security Council to the use of targeted sanctions, against named individuals, and 
smart sanctions, against industries that fuel conflict. In this section I briefly trace these 
developments, highlighting recent resolutions that extend the targeted sanctions regimes to 
individuals suspected of perpetrating crimes of conflict related sexual violence or the 
recruitment of children into military units, as well as recent smart sanctions against wildlife 
traffickers and poachers. I also briefly note the use of naming and shaming initiatives, during 
2010, via the women, peace and security resolutions. 
The Security Council‟s targeted sanction regime was originally designed to target individuals 
within the context of interstate conflict at the commencement of the post-cold war security 
environment with the first sanctions against individuals in Somalia,
40
 Liberia
41
 and the 
Former Yugoslavia.
42
 As such the targeted sanctions regime paralleled the recognition that 
the Charter focus on interstate conflict was insufficient to respond to new security threats. In 
particular, it was recognised that the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against a state 
would be ineffective in halting the violence of non-state actors. By the end of the twentieth 
                                                 
40
 SC Res 751 (1992). 
41
 SC Res 788 (1992). 
42
 SC Res 820 (1993). 
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century, with resolution 1267, the Security Council expanded the targeted sanctions regime to 
impose restrictions on the Taliban in Afghanistan, which became the basis for the post-9/11 
targeted sanctions against terrorist actors including al Qaida.
43
 These earlier initiatives have 
now expanded to include targeted sanctions against perpetrators of specific offences during 
armed conflict, including the recruitment of child soldiers and crimes of sexual violence. 
For example, after the creation of resolution 1888, the Security Council also added 
perpetrators of conflict related sexual violence to the lists of individuals which targeted 
sanctions should be administered against. Thus far, the Security Council‟s sanction 
committee has included sexual violence crimes as the reason for listing four individuals and 
one entity in the DRC.
44
 Security Council resolution 1960 also incorporated provisions for 
the Secretary-General to generate lists of credibly suspected persons that are believed to be 
involved in the perpetrating of widescale and systematic sexual violence in situations on the 
Security Council agenda.
45
 This novel use of the Security Council‟s powers advances a 
process initiated in an earlier resolution on children in armed conflict, where the Security 
Council established a similar listing process.
46
 
In the recent Security Council resolution on children in armed conflict, Resolution 2143,
47
 the 
targeted sanctions regime against recruiters of child soldiers was affirmed as part of a wider 
                                                 
43
 SC Res 1267 (15 October 1999); SC Res 1373 (12
th
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initiative by the Security Council to eradicate the use of children as combatants during armed 
conflict, reiterating „the Security Council‟s readiness to adopt targeted and graduated 
measures against persistent perpetrators of violations and abuses committed against 
children‟.48 While this remains a thematic, or general, resolution the link between this 
resolution and Chapter VII resolutions is made explicit in this wording and underscores the 
role the protection of children has come to play in the authorisation of force and targeted 
sanctions regimes.  
In 2014 the Security Council issued two resolutions implementing smart sanctions against 
wildlife traffickers and poachers. The first, resolution 2134,
49
 addressing the escalation of 
violence in the Central African Republic (CAR) in paragraph 37 establishes that sanctions are 
to be imposed on individuals or entities breaking the arms embargo,
50
 violating human rights 
or international humanitarian law, including acts involving sexual violence,
51
 recruiting or 
using child in the conflict
52
 or „providing support for armed groups or criminal networks 
through the illicit exploitation of natural resources, including diamonds and wildlife and 
wildlife products, in the CAR.‟.53 Resolution 2134 further authorises the creation a European 
Union force to „take all necessary measures‟: that is to use military force alongside the 
sanctions regime.
54
 The second resolution, 2136,
55
 issued two days after the CAR resolution, 
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acknowledges in the preamble, „the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources, including poaching and illegal trafficking of wildlife, illicit trade in such resources, 
and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and 
exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa‟.56 The resolution then expands the 
DRC sanctions regime to include individuals and entities „supporting armed groups in the 
DRC through illicit trade of natural resources, including gold or wildlife as well as wildlife 
products‟57 while later in the resolution the control of illicit trade in natural resources is 
connected to the mandate for MONUSCO.
58
 
Parallel then to the expansion of thematic resolutions the Security Council has expanded the 
means through which it polices conflict zones, requiring states to impose targeted measures 
against a whole range of individuals and requiring states to supply list of perpetrators to the 
Sanction Committee. While the targeted sanctions model is not explicitly found within the 
Charter the wording of Article 41 is broad enough to encompass the types of innovations the 
sanctions regime has undergone. The Charter also does not require any statement of why a 
specific sanctions (or force) resolutions is created, although the Preamble of each situation 
specific resolution often indicates precisely these types of concerns. Humanitarian, human 
rights, women‟s rights and the protection of civilians all appear in the preambles to the 
targeted sanction resolutions, linking the thematic work of the Security Council concretely to 
the expanding sanctions authorisations the Security Council has been prepared to undertake 
since the early 1990s.  
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Further attention should also be paid to how the targeted sanctions authorisations have been 
used by some states, in particular the United States, to explain targeted strikes on the territory 
of other states. This unauthorised force uses the language of targeted strikes, in particular the 
policing nature of the authorisations, to suggest when states are unable to adhere to the 
requirements of the targeted sanctions resolutions there may be a space for states to use 
unauthorised force against the actors named in via targeted sanctions resolutions. The nexus 
between the thematic resolutions on women, peace and security and on the protection of 
children in armed conflict and the expanding targeted sanctions regime is clear in the 
resolutions from Council. The further nexus to a (seemingly spurious and yet ongoing) form 
of unauthorised force raises questions regarding the role of the targeted sanctions regime and 
its relationship to potential to enhance new grounds for the use military force. 
iii. Force Mandates 
The final area of Security Council innovation that I will discuss is the spaces where the 
manner in which force mandates have been transformed since 2008. Prior to 2008 the 
Security Council also used its practice to develop its remit through the authorisation of force 
in humanitarian situations, interstate conflicts, after natural disasters and to restore 
democratic governance. Since 2008 the notable transformation has been the use of the 
language of the responsibility to protect in the resolution authorising the use of force in Libya 
in 2011. However, both peace enforcement missions and robust peacekeeping authorisation 
during the same period also require further attention. In particular, robust peacekeeping links 
the thematic focus of the Security Council developed in the protection of civilians, the 
women, peace and security agenda and the children in armed conflict resolutions to the 
enhanced means through which the Security Council authorises the use of force. Underlying 
these authorisations is a series of assumptions about the vulnerability of civilian 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Journal on the Use of Force and International Law published by 
Taylor & Francis: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjuf20  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23407/  
 
communities, their lack of agency or insight into conflict resolution and the necessity of force 
as a means to resolve an expanding range of scenarios.  
Robust peacekeeping has been developed in the DRC through, first, the creation of a Rapid 
Reaction Force and, more recently, the creation of an Intervention Brigade. The Rapid 
Reaction Force was first established in 2010 alongside the transformation of the MONUC 
force into MONUSCO and was conceived as a reserve force „capable of redeploying rapidly 
elsewhere in the country‟.59 Previously, the MONUC force had be given Chapter VII powers 
to use force for the protection of civilians.
60
 In March 2013 a third authorisation resolution, 
2098, authorised the creation of an Intervention Brigade in the DRC to work alongside the 
stabilisation mission (MONUSCO) and the Rapid Reaction Force.
61
 The 2013 resolution also 
included the call for the modernisation of UN forces, leading to the contribution of unarmed 
UAVs by the US to the MONUSCO forces.
62
 
The preamble to resolution 2098 captures the tensions and paradoxes represented by the 
combination of military and peacekeeping authorisations in the DRC: 
Recalling its resolution 2086 (2013) and reaffirming the basic principles of 
peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, 
except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of 
                                                 
59
 SC Res 1925 (28
th
 May 2010) para. 4. 
60
 SC Res 1565 (1
st
 October 2004). 
61
 SC Res 2098 (28
th
 March 2013) 
62
 SC Res 2098 (28
th
 March 2013) para. 30. 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Journal on the Use of Force and International Law published by 
Taylor & Francis: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjuf20  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23407/  
 
each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country 
concerned.
63
 
As such, although the DRC mission remains a peacekeeping mission resolution 2098 is a 
Chapter VII resolution that identifies a threat to international peace and security, affirms the 
need for impartiality and host state consent also authorises: 
 
. . . on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the 
agreed principles of peacekeeping, include an “Intervention Brigade” consisting inter 
alia of three infantry battalions, one artillery and one Special force and Reconnaissance 
company with headquarters in Goma, under direct command of the MONUSCO Force 
Commander, with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups . . .
64
 
 
The creation of the rapid reaction force and the subsequent intervention brigade in the DRC 
are underpinned with references to the protection of civilians, the protection of women from 
sexual violence and the protection of children. The peacekeeping – military force 
combination in the DRC falls short of an authorisation of the use of force in a manner that 
transforms the mission into a full peace enforcement mission, although the 2004 authorisation 
did transform the rules of peacekeeping engagement to permit the protection of civilians as a 
component for the use of force by peacekeepers.  The hybrid nature of the robust 
peacekeeping mandate in the DRC is clearly built through on the ground communications and 
reporting, conducted primarily through the office of the Secretary-General, yet the 
                                                 
63
 SC Res 2098 (28
th
 March 2013) preamble. 
64
 SC Res 2098 (28
th
 March 2013) para. 9 and 12 (authorising all necessary measures). 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Journal on the Use of Force and International Law published by 
Taylor & Francis: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjuf20  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23407/  
 
justification throughout is one that is built on a narrative of civilian vulnerability that is 
closely entwined with the bodily vulnerability of women (and children).  
The traditional understanding of peacekeeping as built on the notion of host state consent, 
peacekeeper impartiality and an absence of troops from Security Council permanent members 
states
65
 are considerably challenged by the contemporary MONUSCO model. While 
permanent member states have not sent foot soldiers into the DRC the US, in particular, has 
become increasingly involved in military training and logistics as well as fulfilling leadership 
roles. This further blurs the distinction between peacekeeping and military goals that 
surround the mission.  
The key point is to acknowledge that Security Council initiatives to authorise the use of force 
have expanded alongside the protection of civilians agenda while actively referencing the 
protection of civilians to underscore the use of force and ensure widespread support for these 
decisions. Whether we, as individuals, as women, as feminists, as activists, as academics, as 
international lawyers, as collectives or as populations, agree with these as a rationale for the 
authorisation of the use of force is not the point. What requires allusion to and attention is 
that this broadening of force mandates is occurring and the international legal structure 
contains no mechanism for review of these decisions. In the following section I consider this 
point more closely, through a review of the role of the various components of the protection 
of civilians agenda, in particular the developments within the women, peace and security 
framework regarding the regulation of conflict related sexual violence and the use of smart 
sanctions to combat illicit use of natural resources related to funding conflict.  
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III. THE USE OF MILIATRY FORCE AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS: 
WOMEN, CHILDREN, ELEPHANTS 
This section analyses the consequences of the expanding Security Council remit, both in 
terms of force mandates and thematic resolutions, to argue that the protection of civilians has 
been placed in this work as the rationale for Security Council transformation of its output. As 
such, the protection of civilians - and by this I am referring to various components including 
the women, peace and security as well as the protection of children in armed conflict 
resolutions - functions as form of new justification for the use of force. While the close of 
twentieth century and the post-millennium discourse on humanitarian intervention (followed 
by the responsibility to protect) initially signalled this shift yet remained an area of 
disagreement and tenuous legality, the protection of civilians as justification for the 
authorisation of force has emerged with considerably less fanfare or debate. Yet the use of 
the language of the protection of civilians and the increased deployment of military force, as 
well as the accepted use of force within the rules of engagement within peacekeeping 
missions, must be regarded as any other justification for the use of force: on the one hand 
peripheral to the authorisation and one the other hand playing an important symbolic role to 
sustain support for force. In sustaining support for force both the expanded authority of the 
Security Council and the legitimacy of the Security Council as a space of law-making are 
reinforced and enhanced.  I wish to draw out two key aspects connected to this conclusion. 
First, the authorisation of the use of force for the protection of civilians ignores the agency of 
local communities, economic capacities and vulnerabilities as well as the risks force bring to 
communities. Second, the deployment of the protection of civilians as a justification for force 
mandates, while likely to be effective in mobilising international and regional resources, also 
brings the same political contingencies and gains that comes with any other form of force (in 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Journal on the Use of Force and International Law published by 
Taylor & Francis: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjuf20  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23407/  
 
particular, illegal or unjustified force as articulated in debates on humanitarian intervention) 
despite the laudable aims it might appear to prioritise.  
As such, when discussing humanitarian interventions and the responsibility to protect as an 
expansion of collective security norms, as well as with respect to the limitations and legacies 
of decisions to authorise the use of military force, it is time to also raise discussions of the 
expansions of Security Council powers with respect to thematic resolutions, sanctions 
regimes and robust peacekeeping mandates. The range of areas in which the Security 
Council‟s work has expanded has often been developed in response to the lobbying and 
advocacy of those working in grassroots organisations. For example, feminist and women‟s 
networks have shaped and continue to shape the women, peace and security resolutions and 
their implementation. Yet the decision to lobby and promote the expansion of the Security 
Council‟s work comes with no guarantees that this will not be seen as precedent for other 
spaces of expansion or that the histories of imperialism and great power privilege will not 
continue to filter into the policies of these post-millennium initiatives. In fact, larger feminist 
scholarship on the women, peace and security agenda highlights the impact of specific 
feminist agendas in the framing of the resolutions and the legitimacy gained to the Security 
Council through this work.  The western-centred feminist history that is produced through the 
Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security continues a narrative of feminist 
theory as a static approach epitomised by liberal feminist reforms; that have been accused of 
a form of victim feminism and that, in the international arena, rely on the non-western 
woman to be constructed as vulnerable other to be saved by western/feminist policy. This not 
only misrepresents the transnational, diverse spaces that feminist debates evolve within and 
through, this ultimately leads to the limited empowerment of elite women through 
international institutions without attention to the intersection of gender with other sites of 
power within a community, including the international community.  
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Closer examination of the provisions on the combating of conflict-related sexual violence and 
the halt of illicit trade in natural resources further demonstrates that a concern for women‟s 
rights or gender equality is not the primary goal behind Security Council initiatives. Rather 
than promoting Security Council action in response to specific agendas, analysis needs to 
centre on the consequences of broadening force mandates, the long term outcomes of military 
force – including robust peacekeeping – on both the communities where force is deployed 
and the communities who send military actors abroad to participate in United Nations 
missions and to explore fully what it means to have Security Council power expand 
unchecked.  
An early situating of gender equality alongside Chapter VII acts was articulated by the 
Security Council in 1999, prior to the creation of the women, peace and security resolutions, 
in a resolution on the policies of the Taliban in Afghanistan recognising a need for the end to 
discrimination against women and girls in Afghanistan while also establishing a targeted 
sanctions regime.
66
 At this point, the language of the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women is used.
67
 More recently, after the creation of the corpus of 
women, peace and security resolutions the CEDAW Committee has begun to reference the 
1325 framework.
68
 Within that framework both the potential to mobilise force to save women 
from widespread and systematic sexual violence and the means through which the Security 
Council sees its role in regulating conflict related sexual violence is a central component. 
Three of the resolutions on women, peace and security identify the willingness of the 
Security Council to use necessary steps to combat widescale and systematic sexual 
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violence.
69
 In addition, it is important to note the positioning of conflict related sexual 
violence as within the protection of civilians mandate for robust peacekeeping.  
Through the inclusion of sexual violence as part of the mandate for robust peacekeeping and 
as a component of the protection of civilians, the Council signals the potential for force to be 
mobilised to halt widespread and systematic sexual violence. However, important 
understandings of sexual violence in armed conflict are submerged in the appearance of a 
military solution to a complex social and cultural issue.  That sexual violence in armed 
conflict can be both opportunistic and/ or a targeted attack and might be both, that it is a 
heavily gendered crime that disproportionately affects women although men are also subject 
to this form of violence, that transgendered and intersex people are also attacked, that sexual 
violence is perpetrated by UN soldiers, national militaries and non-state actors and that 
military actors, with negative sexual cultures, are unlikely to see the „threat‟ of sexual 
violence to a community as one they should respond to with military force are all invisible in 
a narrative that centres on protection via military force. Yet the Security Council has 
increasingly moved toward the mobilisation of force under the guise of protecting women, as 
civilians and as at risk of sexual violence, but not gender-based violence. If military force is 
unlikely to be the solution to conflict-related sexual violence we need to ask why this has 
been such a central component of the Security Council‟s women, peace and security agenda. 
Part of the answer to this type of question lies in the additional measures the Security Council 
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has established to respond to conflict-related sexual violence which centre primarily on the 
provision of prosecution processes and/ or sanctions regimes. Like the use of force, the 
capacity of prosecutions to challenge and halt the perpetration of crimes of sexual violence is 
questionable. Instead it seems the linkage between measures in response to conflict related 
sexual violence, targeted sanctions and the authorisation of military force by the Security 
Council might be more correctly understood as a mechanism that at once underscores the 
vulnerability of women in conflict, in particular the construction of women‟s specific bodily 
vulnerability alongside the expansion of the Security Council‟s remit. That the end of 
conflict-related sexual violence is not the key goal of these strategies is best demonstrated by 
the UN‟s own weak initiatives to regulate sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse 
perpetrated by either national or international forces, or to hold states accountable for failures 
to discipline or sanction their personnel.  
Similarly the initiatives to target the funds that support conflict that emerge from the illicit 
trade in natural resources, such as the ivory trade in the DRC, has an expanded regime of 
sanctions, as well as now understood within the Security Council resolutions as constituting  
a threat to international peace and security.
70
 Yet the focus here is not the protection of 
elephants, rather the end of the flow of funds from illegal trade in ivory to conflict zones. 
This distinction is important as it illuminates a misunderstanding deeply embedded in 
feminist advocacy within the collective security arena: the Council‟s primary work is about 
collective action not women‟s livelihoods. That is, the sexual violence resolutions and the 
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women, peace and security framework ultimately do not prioritise gender equality, gender 
perspectives or even women‟s rights rather they exist to enhance the work of the Security 
Council as an international institution with the capacity to authorise the use of military force. 
Since 2008 the expansion of force mandates by the Security Council can be linked to the 
expansion of the women, peace and security agenda and its larger positioning within the 
protection of civilians focus. Both the enlarged forms of force, such as robust peacekeeping, 
and the plethora of women, peace and security resolutions now in existence can be tracked 
from 2008.  
Ultimately, the authorisation of military force requires normative underpinning to assemble 
support from international actors, soldiers and Member states: throughout this article I have 
examined the role that the Security Council‟s thematic resolutions crossover from their 
placement within general resolutions to complement and justify the development of a broad 
agenda around sanctions and the use of force. Within this agenda, the women, peace and 
security framework functions to complement the protection of civilians agenda. Under 
narratives of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect the saving strangers 
narrative has been raised as a questionable grounds for international interventions as it often 
functions as a smokescreen for the deployment of larger political goals. The protection of 
civilians framework and its nexus to force has not received the level of scrutiny that the 
responsibility to protect has received yet the authorisation of force to protect civilians is of 
equal concern to the Security Council‟s use of the responsibility to protect authorisations.  
In addition the blurring between peace enforcement, robust peacekeeping and the 
authorisation of force should trigger a space to think concretely about the expansion of 
Security Council powers and the role that feminist lobbying and strategy have played in 
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underpinning these developments. At this point it seems useful to recall the words of Simone 
Weir in her analysis of the poem the Iliad,  
But nothing the peoples of Europe have produced is worth the first known poem that 
appeared among them. Perhaps they will rediscover the epic genius, when they learn 
that there is no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, nor to hate the enemy, nor to 
scorn the unfortunate. How soon this will happen is another question.
71
 
Weil‟s thesis, that force destroys and transforms both its perpetrators and victims, 
„vanquished and victors‟72 identifies the arrogance of those who use force for what they 
believe to be just causes and the impossibility of deploying force in moderation.
73
 Robust 
peacekeeping, as a time limited and strategic deployment of military units suggests that the 
contemporary work of the Security Council has engaged in precisely this type of justified, 
moderate deployment of force even as history tells us military units are not the precision 
weapon this strategy would require. In the words of Weil, „force is as pitiless to the man who 
possesses it, or think he does, as it is to its victims; the second it crushes, the first it 
intoxicates‟.74 The protection of womenandchildren and elephants is not the rationale for the 
use of force and the use of force will not protect civilians, or elephants, as force begets force 
and denies the real spaces of agency, engagement and need that happen within civilian 
communities where conflict rages. To find the components of peace local actors, local 
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initiatives and local economic needs must be addressed before or instead of the deployment 
of elite military corps to the region.  
It remains true that the role of international institutions has been transformed in the post-Cold 
War period and again after the millennium, yet feminist scholarship on the work of 
international institutions, in particular with reference to the legitimacy of law-making and 
expansions of authority, has been rare. The consequence has been a willingness from feminist 
scholars to engage international institutions as a space of transformative gender politics and 
gender-focused law reform. The acceptance by (some) international institutions of the need 
for gender sensitive law reform, most prominently the UN Security Council, has become a 
signal of the „acceptance‟ of gender perspectives within the mainstream of international law. 
This has reduced the possibility for feminist dialogue on the risks of working through 
international institutions, given the structural and embedded understandings of gender within 
those institutions. Consequently, the co-optation of some feminist ideas within international 
institutions illuminates the dangers of endorsing and legitimating institutions without an 
additional project of challenging the institution itself as gendered.
75
 To this end this article 
has asserted that the authority of Security Council to authorise new measures short of force, 
and new forms of force, is bolstered by the potential legitimacy the women, peace and 
security framework, as well as the protection of civilians mantra, deploy through the pursuit 
of a widening of authority that is ultimately be counterproductive from a feminist perspective 
and a feminist politics of peace.
76
  
                                                 
75
 Otto, D, 'The Security Council‟s Alliance of Gender Legitimacy' in H. Charlesworth, 
J. Coicaud (ed), Fault Lines of International Legitimacy (2010) 239-275. 
76
 See: Heathcote, G, „A Feminist Perspective on the Law on the Use of Force‟ in Weller, M., The Oxford 
Handbook on the Law on the Use of Force, OUP, 2015 
